Fiscal consolidations and their effects on income inequality by Scheibe, C
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conrad Scheibe 
 
 
 
FISCAL CONSOLIDATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON INCOME 
INEQUALITY 
An empirical analysis of the distributional effects of austerity, using 
a novel approach to identify consolidation compositions  
 
Master's Thesis (Short version) 
 
 
Berlin, Germany 
30 October 2016 
 
  
  
Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of fiscal consolidations on income inequality. Although 
fiscal consolidations have become a popular policy instrument and research topic, their 
effects on income inequality are relatively unexplored. We thus econometrically analyse 
the evolution of Gini coefficients during and after austerity measures. The paper relies 
on panel data techniques using a sample of 17 high-income countries during the period 
of 1978 – 2009. We find that a consolidation (measured by a deliberate improvement of 
the primary budget balance) significantly increases income inequality. More specifically, 
an improvement of the primary budget balance by about one percent of GDP is associated 
with an increase in market income inequality of 0.6% and a smaller increase in net 
income inequality the following year. In addition, this paper explores the discretionary 
effect of different consolidation compositions. To do so, we differentiate between 
consolidations that are either exclusively undertaken through spending cuts, tax 
increases or a combination of both. Thereby, we show that tax-only consolidations tend 
to be equality-friendly but also rather small in size while the opposite is true for 
spending-only and mixed consolidations. These findings point to a more pronounced 
trade-off between different consolidation policy goals than is currently believed.  
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 1 Introduction 
The 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession imposed devastating 
effects on the financial sector and the real economy. In turn, many governments saw 
themselves forced to spend large amounts of money to rescue banks and provide fiscal 
stimulus to restore economic momentum. As a result, public debt, especially in advanced 
economies, climbed to all-time highs, cutting their fiscal space significantly. Also, the fiscal 
deficit in the OECD area peaked unprecedentedly at almost 8% of GDP in 2009, with only 
minor improvements in the following three years (OECD, 2014). With ageing populations and 
associated high future public costs, these deficits are seen as unsustainable for many 
countries. The thus created pressure to stabilise public debt and overhaul public budgets led 
governments to undertake severe fiscal consolidations. Based on that, a relatively large body 
of literature has dealt with debt and growth implications caused by fiscal austerity.  
However, there is only a rather small body of literature focusing on the inequality effects 
resulting from fiscal consolidations. This is somewhat surprising since the economic and 
social repercussions of the Great Recession and the consequent fall in employment rates 
have resulted in historically high levels of income inequality in many developed countries. 
Hence, it appears that fiscal consolidations and rises in inequality are at least to some extent 
interconnected. These questions are particularly interesting since economic inequality has 
recently received greater academic and public attention. This might also be sparked by the 
long-term trend of increased inequality in the developed world. Between 1990 and 2012 the 
Gini coefficient of market income increased more than five percentage points in OECD 
countries (OECD, 2015a; FES, 2015). 
If academics accept that some level of inequality should probably exist in a market economy, 
there is also an expectation that too much inequality will have perverse effects on markets 
(Freeman, 2011; Stiglitz, 2012; Piketty, 2014; Krugman, 2015). Indeed, inequality may harm 
long-term growth through a number of channels around political and economic exclusions 
(see e.g. Easterly, 2007; Ostry et al., 2011; Stiglitz, 2012). As summarised so aptly by Piketty 
(2014): “You need some inequality to grow. But extreme inequality is not only useless but 
can be harmful to growth because it reduces mobility and can lead to political capture of our 
democratic institutions”. Going further, some scholars argue that high-income inequality 
may be a partial direct or indirect cause of the crisis, at least in some countries, such as the 
United States (Fitoussi & Saraceno, 2010; Rajan, 2010; Stiglitz, 2012). Others posit that the 
recent populist backlash throughout Europe and the United States - both on the right and 
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the left – against trade, globalisation, and migration could also be explained by some of these 
mechanisms (Roubini, 2016).  
In the light of the renewed attention on this topic, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
restated its position on fiscal consolidation. With their 2010 “Ten Commandments for Fiscal 
Adjustment in Advanced Economies”, they explicitly mentioned the role of inequality 
(Blanchard & Cotarelli, 2010), acknowledging in particular that an evaluation of any fiscal 
consolidation policy should not only consider the impact it has on output, employment, and 
the fiscal balance, but also on the income distribution. Against this backdrop, the question 
arises, how fiscal consolidations can be designed to cushion the blow for the most vulnerable 
ones.  
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to discuss the general effect of fiscal consolidations on 
inequality and to differentiate between the discretionary impacts that different 
consolidation packages have on inequality indicators. Thus, a central contribution of this 
article is to investigate the importance of the mix of instruments used to achieve fiscal 
consolidation and to identify which instruments best limit a rise in inequality. Thereby, this 
paper seeks to find new evidence for the discretionary compositional effects, by using a novel 
approach to identify consolidations, which are either only based on tax rises, spending cuts 
or through a combination of both.  
To examine income inequality effects associated to fiscal consolidations, this paper builds 
upon a narrow body of literature that quantitatively assesses these mechanisms. Namely, 
Woo et al. (2013) and Agnello & Sousa (2012) act as the main inspirations for the deployed 
regression analyses. In line with these scholars, this paper will apply econometric analyses to 
assess the impact of different consolidations on the income inequality measurements as 
illustrated by rises in the Gini coefficients.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, a literature survey discussing the 
effects of fiscal consolidations on income inequality is presented. The third section is 
dedicated to presenting the data, including income inequality trends throughout the last 
decades. Next, section 4 presents and discusses the econometric findings. Section 5 
concludes. 
 2 Literature Survey 
The causes of rising income inequality have attracted considerable attention recently. Most 
studies find that national income per capita, education, trade openness and technological 
change are among the main levers for differing inequality levels across countries (Acemoglu, 
2003; IMF, 2007; Barro, 2008). At the same time, fiscal policy can have a strong impact on 
income distribution within a society. Especially the design and progressivity of tax systems 
and spending policies are deemed decisive for income distributions (Chu et al., 2000; Bastagli 
et al., 2012; IMF, 2014; Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). There is, however, little research investing 
the impact on inequality of changes in the fiscal stance and in particular on adjustment 
efforts. 
2.1 The distributional effect of fiscal consolidations  
Most studies investigating the effects of fiscal consolidation on income inequality point to a 
negative link. Using a panel of 18 industrialized countries Agnello & Sousa (2012) present 
evidence that inequality generally increases during periods of fiscal consolidation. Ball et al. 
(2011) find that a consolidation of the primary balance about one percent of GDP lead to an 
increase in disposable income by 0.6% in the following year. Smeeding et al. (2000) observe 
that a fiscal consolidation normally leads to increased poverty and thereby rising income 
gaps. Woo et al. (2013) & the IMF (2012) find that large consolidations (greater than 1.5% of 
GDP) significantly increase inequality, while smaller ones do not. Moreover, they observe the 
cumulative inequality effect of consolidations peaking after five to six years and fading just 
ten years after the start. The IMF (2014) acknowledges that “fiscal consolidation can affect 
income inequality through its impact on the distribution of both market and disposable 
income”. The main reasons are seen in the short-run reduction in output and employment, 
followed by declines in wage shares briefly after a consolidation. Especially when 
accompanying growth is weak, these effects may be long-lasting and particularly self-
reinforcing. This thought is particularly interesting, since - if this vicious circle assumption 
holds - it supports the idea that consolidation packages should be both growth- and equity-
friendly.  
Particularly the rise in unemployment, which usually follows a period of fiscal adjustments, 
is seen as the main trigger for widening income gaps (Leigh et al., 2010; IMF, 2012; Woo et 
al., 2013). More precisely, Ball et al. (2011) find that a reduction of the primary balance by 
about one percent of GDP leads to an increase in unemployment of 0.5 percentage points in 
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the course of two years. The mechanisms behind these effects are believed to stem from 
both direct income effects, such as the permanent reduction of household income and 
indirect, structural effects such as the loss of self-confidence and thereby lower chances of 
getting rehired the longer the unemployment period persists (Blanchard & Summers, 1986; 
Dao & Loungani, 2010). 
Turning to different consolidation strategies, Leigh et al. (2010) observe that spending cuts 
affect unemployment faster and stronger than tax hikes. Mulas-Granados (2005) finds 
evidence that spending-based adjustments generally come at the price of higher income 
inequality. Agnello & Sousa (2012) observe that consolidations mainly relying on spending 
cuts lead to a substantial widening of income gaps. This effect is found to be amplified if 
growth is low during the referring period and also with increasing sizes of adjustments. On 
the contrary, tax hikes are found to have an equalizing effect on income inequality. 
However, these findings can be challenged from a theoretical point of view as, for example, 
higher unemployment benefits may reduce both skilled and unskilled employment. In turn, 
this would have to lead to rising income inequality (Checchi & García-Peñalosa, 2008) so that 
spending cuts appear to have a somewhat ambiguous effect on income inequality. Therefore, 
the focus should rather lie on which instruments - on both the taxation and spending side - 
are associated with more favourable inequality effects. In this vein, the IMF (2014) states that 
raising regressive taxes and cutting progressive spending tend to increase income inequality 
considerably. They conclude that the key to equity-friendly adjustments lies in the 
progressive mix of different instruments. Yet, they acknowledge that consolidation packages, 
however progressively designed, may still lead to short-term inequality rises.  
With this in mind, Woo et al. (2013) use the ratio of direct to indirect taxes as a proxy for tax 
progressivity and observe that higher values, as well as higher social spending introduced in 
the context of general spending cuts, are clearly associated with reducing inequality. They 
derive that adjustment packages should consider distributional effects to cushion the blow 
for the most vulnerable ones (which is also confirmed by Chu et al., 2000).  
The work of IMF (2012) acknowledges that both spending and revenue side measures have 
important implications for employment and inequality that are relevant in order to make the 
consolidation package sustainable. Therefore, they see high degrees of tax progressivity and 
access to social benefits as pre-requisite to limit the negative effects of adjustment packages. 
They observe that spending-based consolidations tend to be larger and last longer and have 
a greater impact on income distribution than revenue based ones. Especially cuts in social 
benefits are found to be the most painful measure on the spending side. Turning to tax hikes, 
they observe that consolidations, which rely more on indirect taxes tend to worsen 
2 Literature Survey  5 
inequality. The most equity-friendly consolidations are found to be the ones where indirect 
tax increases were combined with offsetting measures targeted at poor households.  
Macroeconomic conditions also seem to matter for the decision on which consolidation 
instrument to use. Mulas-Granados (2005) observes that governments tend to undertake 
inequality-enhancing spending cuts, whenever the macroeconomic conditions worsen 
considerably. Especially GDP growth seems to be lower before expenditure cuts than before 
revenue increases. Moreover, the same applies to unemployment rates, levels of 
government debt and deficit as well as inflation rates. This could be interpreted as a higher 
willingness of the population to accept painful measures when times are perceived to be bad 
or the economic stability is under severe stress. The choice on which of the targets to follow 
within consolidations is also found to be influenced by political factors, such as electoral 
outlooks as well as the ideology of the government in power (Mulas-Granados, 2002, 2003). 
Schaltegger & Weder (2014) find that consolidations implemented by coalition governments 
are associated with lower levels of income inequality while the opposite is true for single-
party or minority governments. 
Woo et al. (2013) stress the importance of avoiding significant worsening of income 
distribution during times of fiscal consolidation, since consolidations perceived as unfair 
might be difficult to maintain (also confirmed by McManus, 2014). Jenkins et al. (2011) find 
that countries with a relatively strong welfare state do experience a smaller adverse 
distributional impact in economic crises as a result of greater automatic fiscal stabilisers. 
Mulas-Granados (2005) confirms these findings analysing 53 adjustments in 15 EU countries 
over four decades. In addition, he points out that there might be room for an enhancement 
of the social safety net and more progressive tax measures during spending cuts in order to 
offset negative distributional effects, since these are associated with narrowing inequality 
ratios (which is also confirmed by Joumard et al., 2012 & Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2012).  
2.2 The trade-off between growth, debt, and equality friendly adjustments 
It seems that many of the features of successful and growth-friendly adjustments stated 
earlier are not particularly equality-friendly, meaning that they would lead to higher income 
inequality. Yet, there is also evidence that not all of these targets always have to be 
necessarily conflicting. As governments always face the choice between several goals, fiscal 
policy should serve, and can draw on a multitude of instruments to achieve these ends, it is 
worth looking at possible trade-offs between growth, debt, and inequality targets within 
fiscal consolidations.  
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There are several explanations for the mechanics of potentially contradictory effects of 
consolidation on income distribution and GDP growth. In line with previously mentioned 
scholars, Mulas-Granados (2005) observes possible expansionary consolidations as those, 
that focus on the spending side and, on the most rigid budget items, namely public wages 
and social transfers. However, he interprets reductions especially in these areas as income 
inequality increasing. This reasoning builds upon the work of Ayala et al. (1999) and Chu et 
al. (2000) who present empirical evidence that social spending is strongly attributed to 
reducing net income inequality. Notably, public health spending, pensioners and education 
spending are found to be most suitable to reduce inequality.  
On the tax side, there is evidence that proportionally high direct taxes are suited to distribute 
income from the high-earning household to the state and via the described channels to the 
worse-off (Mulas-Granados, 2005; IMF, 2012; McManus, 2014). However, these taxes are 
seen to be distortive for the efficiency and functioning of free markets and therefore harming 
private investment and productivity (Przeworski, 1986; Boix, 1996). Hence, raising these 
taxes as an instrument of consolidation may have a positive effect on reducing inequality, 
but rather a negative one for growth perspectives. Espinoza & Ruiz (2016) simulate different 
fiscal policy changes in France and evaluate their growth and inequality impact. They find 
that trade-offs between achieving successful fiscal consolidations and stabilizing inequality 
at the same time could be possible (with the exception of using increases in capital income 
taxes). Well-designed packages (i.e. a cut in public spending partly offset by a reduction in 
social contribution paid by low skilled workers) can achieve both, successful consolidation 
and unchanged or even improved Gini coefficients. In this vein, the ECB notes that well-
designed consolidation packages, such as cuts in unproductive spending and revenue 
measures, aimed at greater tax system efficiency and fairness are most suited to reach fiscal 
sustainability in line with other policy goals (Warmedinger et al., 2015). 
Kaplanoglou et al. (2013) find that “fair” fiscal adjustment programmes lead to higher 
probabilities of success. They mainly focus on progressive taxation and social transfers and 
find evidence that adjustments that are accompanied by redistributive policies aiming for 
higher progressivity are more likely to succeed. In this vein, Rawdanowicz et al. (2013) 
analyse the distributional impacts of different fiscal adjustment instruments. Interestingly for 
this paper, they find that several consolidation instruments are consistent with both: 
Reducing income inequality without harming growth. They define the progressivity of each 
instrument and its relative weight in the tax and transfer system as decisive elements for 
distributional effects. Both social spending and taxation of households are found to dampen 
income inequality in general, although in most OECD countries the former effect outweighs 
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the latter. However, transfers might reduce incentives to work and therefore harm growth 
perspectives. Some household taxes on the other hand also are distortive to GDP growth. 
Based on this framework, they observe increases in the effective retirement age, raising 
efficiency in the education and health care systems, cutting certain tax expenditures, raising 
taxes on immovable property, and broadly-based consumption taxes as suitable instruments 
to achieve both goals.  
The OECD (2013) uses a similar approach to differentiate between consolidation instruments 
which are growth-supporting, equity-friendly or both at the same time. Based on that, they 
develop a hierarchical ranking of consolidation instruments. Cuts in subsidies and pensions 
as well as raising property taxes are ranked highest since they entail strong distributive power 
without hurting economic activity much, while the opposite is true for cuts on education, 
family, and social security (similar results attained by Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2012).  
Based on the mentioned literature, detailed effects of spending and revenue based 
consolidation instruments can be classified, which will be elaborated on more in detail in the 
following chapters of this paper. 
 3 Data and trends in income inequality 
3.1 Measuring fiscal consolidation and income inequality  
A variety of measures can be used to identify consolidation episodes. Earlier papers used the 
cyclically adjusted budget (CAPB) as their main measure (Giavazzi & Paggano, 1990; Alesina 
& Perotti, 1996). It is calculated by subtracting estimated effects of business cycle 
fluctuations on the fiscal account from the actual primary balance. Interest expenditure is 
excluded from this indicator as well since it is not considered discretionary (Guarjardo et al., 
2014).  
However, this approach is not free from critique. As Devries et al. (2011) note, the approach 
suffers from measurement errors that are correlated with the business cycle and therefore 
might be underestimating contractionary effect. Instead, Devries et al.’s so-called “narrative” 
approach, which is used in this paper, builds on policymakers’ intentions and reviews official 
publications on changes in the fiscal stance, published by institutions such as the IMF, the 
OECD or national treasuries. Therefore, consolidation episodes identified by this approach 
refer to periods, in which changes in fiscal policies were motivated by the intention to reduce 
public deficits. Another advantage of this approach is that by looking at policymakers’ 
decisions, this procedure eliminates endogeneity problems, consisting of fiscal policy 
responses to the economy. 
Defining a single indicator that captures the many aspects of economic inequality is 
challenging if not impossible. The most popular indicator is the well-known Gini coefficient 
(Hoeller et al., 2012; Keeley, 2015), which benefits from high data availability. Nevertheless, 
it is relatively insensitive to movements at the upper-end of the income distribution, and it 
can fail to accurately capture simultaneous changes for different income shares (FES, 2015). 
One reason behind this is that the richest households tend to be underrepresented in 
household surveys (Alvaredo, 2011). Hence, other indicators, such as quintile shares, the 
Theil, or Atkinson index, might be more accurate to gauge income inequality but are far less 
available. We will, therefore, use Gini here to measure inequality. 
To account for redistributive policies and their effect on inequality, the literature mostly 
focuses on two different versions of the Gini coefficient: Gini coefficients gross and net of 
taxes. While the former refers to income distribution before state interventions through 
taxation, the latter is constructed after deducting them. The difference between these two 
values, therefore, represents the absolute redistributive power of a state. More developed 
economies with fully fledged welfare state systems use higher social spending and taxation 
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to redistribute income, which should be reflected in a higher difference between the two 
Gini coefficients.  
As it can be seen in Figure 1, income inequality has increased over the last decades in most 
advanced countries that are included in this paper. While in most European countries the 
Gini coefficients before taxation and social spending stood at levels between 38 and 45 in 
the 1970s, they increased up to values of around 50. A similar pattern can be seen for the 
Gini coefficients of net disposable income, which stood below 30 in the 1970s for most 
European countries. Today, the referring values are mostly considerably higher, with the UK 
being the most unequal European country in the sample (36). The European trends are 
particularly interesting since these countries are supposed to be among the most equal ones 
in the world. The focus on a broader sample, given by the average OECD Gini coefficients, 
confirms this trend. The average net Gini coefficient stood at 29 throughout the OECD 
countries in the mid-80s and increased to 32 in 2010. It rose in 17 out of 22 OECD countries 
(OECD, 2011). Between 1990 and 2012 the Gini coefficient of market income increased on 
average by more than five percentage points throughout the OECD countries.  
 
Figure 1: Increasing Inequality between 1970 & 20102
 
 
3.2 Data 
This paper bases its econometric findings on a sample of 17 advanced economies and uses 
the dataset of Devries et al. (2011).3 The sample period spans from 1978 – 2009. The key 
variables of interests here are:  
 
                                                          
2 Own illustration, based on SWIID data. Note: 1970 Data for Belgium & Portugal are for 1972 & 1973 
respectively. 
3 More precisely the countries used are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom & the 
United States of America.  
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Gini index (Market & Net income Gini): In line with the overall inequality literature the 
Gini index is used to account for income inequality and referring changes over time as 
well as comparisons across countries. Focusing on two different variables of interest by 
differentiating two income definitions (gross and net of taxes and social spending by 
governments), helps to account for redistribution, which is the difference between the 
two values. This might be particularly important for the advanced economies included in the 
sample, which use greater redistributional power in order to dampen income inequality. 
Gross inequality is often used synonymous for market income inequality, although this paper 
will only use the latter name. Similarly, net income inequality is sometimes referred to as 
disposable income inequality. Data for the Gini indexes are taken from the Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), version 4.1. This database depicts the most 
comprehensive inequality database at the moment and harmonises results of different 
studies and therefore generates greater comparability (Solt, 2014).  
Fiscal consolidation: Episodes of fiscal consolidation are derived from the narrative 
approach suggested by Devries et al’s. (2011) and using their database. As can be seen in 
Appendix 3, out of the 544 relevant data-points, 165 are identified as fiscal consolidation 
years. The raw data conveniently reports the overall consolidation size, as well as tax-
based and spending-based consolidation sizes. We can thus derive dummies capturing 
the occurrence of an overall fiscal consolidation and of tax or spending-based 
adjustments, as these are the variables we want to relate to the total values of budget 
balance improvement in percent of GDP. 
In addition, we use a set of standard controls. These include: 
Income per capita: We use log of income per capita and it's square as we assume a non-
linear relationship between income and inequality (Kuznets, 1955; Barro, 2000; Barro, 
2008; Barro & Lee, 2013). The data is taken from the Penn World Tables (Version 7.1) 
and refer to real (PPP converted) GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD.  
Inflation: Theory suggests that high inflation would hurt the poor more than higher 
income groups and thereby widen the income gap, due to differences in wealth and 
income protection abilities between the rich and the poor during inflation periods (Bulir, 
1998; Easterly & Fisher, 2001; Albanesi, 2007). However, the dataset comprises only 
high-income countries with moderate average inflation rates (4.4% p.a. over the whole 
sample period). As observed by Bulir (1998), during years of relatively low inflation, the 
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impact on inequality tends to be counter-intuitive, if financial deepening is sufficiently 
high (which can be assumed for our sample). Moreover, reverse causation is possible as 
suggested by Crowe (2006). Hence, the resulting effect of inflation is expected to be 
ambiguous. The data used, refer to the annual change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Data are extracted from the OECD Economic Outlook database (No. 98). 
Trade Openness: The share of trade on GDP can affect the distribution of income 
depending on factor endowments. While inequality in developed countries is observed 
to rise with higher trade openness, the opposite is true for developing countries due to 
the different relation of capital income over labour income, which is relatively higher in 
developed countries and benefits from greater trade openness (IMF, 2007). Since the 
countries used here are exclusively high-income countries, but the sample time is 
relatively long, trade openness is expected to have a somewhat ambiguous impact on 
income inequality. The data are extracted from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database. 
The data and variables used are broadly in line with the most relevant studies on fiscal 
consolidation and income inequality, in order to keep the baseline results comparable. 
However, this paper introduces an innovative way to classify consolidation compositions 
in section 4.2.2. 
 4 Econometric Analysis 
Analysing the dataset of Devries et al. (2011), one can observe that in the sample 51 episodes 
of fiscal consolidations took place between 1978 and 2009. Hereby, an episode may consist 
of several years if the consolidation efforts were ongoing. Applying this approach leads to a 
total of 165 years, in which consolidation programmes were in place, resulting in an episode 
averaging to 3.24 years. Table 1 shows that the average consolidation size amounts to 3.4 
percent of GDP throughout the whole sample. By comparing the cumulative changes in the 
inequality indexes during these episodes, one can already derive intuitions on the general 
distributional consequences of fiscal consolidation. As can be seen, fiscal consolidations 
typically lead to substantial variation in income inequality measures. Market income 
inequality increases on average 0.92 Gini points during a consolidation episode. Disposable 
income inequality just increases by 0.33 Gini points, indicating that redistribution might, in 
general, be cushioning the distributional effect of fiscal consolidations.  
 
Table 1: Overview of all consolidation episodes and their inequality effects4
 
 
Since the full distributional effects of policy changes are considered to take some time until 
they fully materialise, the same analysis is repeated with a lag of one year in the inequality 
measures. In this context, market income inequality is surprisingly observed to increase on 
average slightly less (0.78 Gini points), while net inequality grows stronger than during the 
consolidation episode (0.45). This could be explained by an improvement in labour market 
                                                          
4 Own illustration, based on SWIID & Devries et al. (2011) data 
Period Δ Cons Δ GiniM
Δ GiniM, 
t+1
Δ GiniN
Δ GiniN, 
t+1
Period Δ Cons Δ GiniM
Δ GiniM, 
t+1
Δ GiniN
Δ GiniN, 
t+1
Australia 1985-1988 2.47 1.01 0.00 0.82 1.00 Italy 1991-1998 19.23 5.72 6.54 4.59 4.88
1994-1999 2.47 4.02 3.04 1.82 1.57 2004-2007 4.72 -0.74 -2.20 -0.90 -1.60
Austria 1980-1981 2.36 . . . . Japan 1979-1983 1.89 -6.33 -4.21 -1.10 0.07
1984 2.04 -0.94 -2.16 -0.38 -0.88 1997-1998 1.90 1.18 2.01 1.14 1.32
1996-1997 3.97 -0.91 -0.44 -1.10 -0.80 2003-2007 2.27 -1.63 -0.68 0.10 0.26
2001-2002 1.57 1.53 1.40 0.78 0.57 Netherlands 1981-1988 12.98 0.41 -1.28 0.16 0.82
Belgium 1982-1985 5.75 2.91 2.65 -0.01 0.10 1991-1993 1.73 1.00 0.18 -0.90 -0.83
1987 2.80 0.32 0.16 0.17 0.12 2004-2005 2.20 0.51 0.24 0.71 0.41
1990 0.60 1.08 0.37 0.02 -0.44 Portugal 1983 2.30 -2.46 0.47 -1.31 -1.04
1992-1994 3.86 1.12 1.60 1.61 4.40 2000 0.50 -1.12 0.62 -0.10 0.23
1996-1997 1.91 1.00 0.36 -1.60 0.35 2002 1.60 1.22 2.74 0.32 0.45
Canada 1984-1997 7.93 5.01 6.74 0.49 2.53 2005-2007 3.65 2.13 -0.05 -1.16 -1.68
Denmark 1983-1985 6.69 -1.79 -1.11 -0.88 -0.55 Spain 1983-1984 3.02 -1.81 -2.24 -1.67 -1.93
1995 0.30 -0.18 0.07 -0.76 0.23 1989 1.22 2.31 2.84 1.43 1.95
Finland 1992-1997 11.43 6.51 4.11 2.02 2.74 1992-1997 6.64 5.26 2.30 3.73 1.93
France 1979 0.85 0.10 0.22 -0.18 -0.12 Sweden 1984 0.90 0.20 0.36 0.25 0.25
1987 0.26 -0.31 0.15 -1.28 -0.80 1993-1998 10.59 0.67 -0.04 -0.33 1.18
1991 0.25 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.04 United Kingdom 1979-1982 2.46 4.04 3.41 0.81 0.71
1995-1997 2.11 0.64 0.03 -0.28 -0.27 1994-1999 2.61 0.56 -0.90 0.65 0.32
Germany 1982-1984 2.23 3.40 2.59 2.10 0.98 United States 1978 0.14 0.05 0.04 -0.34 -0.48
1991-1995 3.67 1.66 0.36 0.76 0.38 1980-1981 0.29 0.41 0.52 0.75 0.66
1997 1.60 0.21 0.16 -0.13 -0.13 1985-1986 0.31 1.50 0.89 1.26 0.71
1999-2000 1.00 0.54 1.09 0.01 0.43 1988 0.85 0.20 0.21 0.12 0.10
2003-2004 1.14 0.82 0.66 0.39 0.41 1990-1998 3.92 3.45 2.98 3.73 3.47
2006-2007 1.40 0.74 0.44 0.78 0.34
Ireland 1981-1987 10.05 -0.14 -0.55 -0.18 -0.41 Average 3.24 3.40 0.92 0.76 0.33 0.47
2008 4.74 1.74 2.01 -0.20 -0.12 ∑  episodes/years 51/165
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outcomes whenever fiscal policy relaxes (IMF, 2015). In general, it is quite evident that 
inequality rises after consolidations, although there are some exceptions. For example, 
Ireland’s long consolidation episode in the 1980s was followed by slight decreases in all 
inequality measures, while a larger decrease in inequality was observed after Japan’s fiscal 
contraction from 1979 onwards.  
In Figure 2 the total size of consolidation is plotted on the horizontal axis against the 
cumulative inequality changes on the vertical axis. The consolidation sizes are grouped into 
the most frequent ranges that are also roughly equally distributed. The right part of the chart 
repeats the same exercise with one year lagged change in the inequality measures. It can be 
seen that the size of the consolidation seems to matter for the resulting income inequality 
changes. In particular, larger consolidations are followed by widening income gaps. This 
indicates that these consolidations affect households at the bottom of the income 
distribution disproportionally more. When the consolidation represents a small share of GDP 
the impact on market inequality during the consolidation and one year after is also relatively 
small. For disposable income inequality, the effect is even negligible when the consolidation 
is below 1% of GDP. One reason could be that larger adjustments might include deeper 
spending cuts that hit poor households more.  
 
Figure 2: Inequality development after consolidation episodes5
 
 
To go beyond these observed unconditional correlations, we need to explore the relationship 
between inequality and consolidations further, using appropriate econometric techniques.  
4.1 Methodology 
In order to test the relationship between fiscal adjustment measures and resulting changes 
in inequality this paper applies panel data technique, to consider both cross-sectional and 
                                                          
5 Own illustration, based on SWIID & Devries et al. (2011) data 
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time dimensions. Building on the literature, we use a model consistent with IMF (2012), Woo 
et al. (2013) and Agnello & Sousa (2014). In particular, we first reproduce first the model of 
Agnello & Sousa (2014): 
 
Yit = Xit β + αi + Uit, 
 
Where Yit = (Yitmarket, Yitnet), represents the market and the net income Gini index respectively. 
The regressor matrix is denoted by Xit = (X1market, X2net), where β = (β1market, β2net) are the 
associated coefficients. αi and Uit are the error terms, assumed to have zero means and 
mutually uncorrelated with Xit. The main regressor matrix consists of the log of per capita 
GDP and its squared form, trade openness, and various variables, capturing fiscal 
consolidation occurrences. Applying time lags in the independent variables seems convincing 
since  the effects of fiscal consolidations need some time to fully unfold. Especially their 
effects on income inequality are expected to occur with some time lag since they work 
through different channels. These augmentations lead to the following baseline model:  
 
      Ginimarketit = cons. + β1 log_GDPt-1 + β2 log_GDP2t-1 + β3 inflationt-1 + β4 tradeopennesst-1  
+ β5 fiscal consolidationt-1 + αi + Uit. 
 
Here, we will start by using the market income Gini coefficient as dependent variable before 
turning our attention to the net income Gini coefficient. Fiscal consolidation will also first be 
proxied by the dummy variable capturing the occurrence of a consolidation period, before 
being replaced by the actual value of the primary balance improvement in percent of GDP. 
Afterwards, the baseline model will be augmented in different ways, in order to test the 
mentioned effects.  
 
 
4.2 Results 
We will present our results here, noting that they should be interpreted as associations, 
rather than causations.  
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4.2.1 The effect of fiscal consolidation on income inequality 
Table 2 reports the output of three regressions undertaken to establish the baseline model 
as described in the last section. Column 1 focuses on the whole set of control variables, 
without adding consolidation variables. The two GDP indicators are used to test the expected 
Kuznets relationship as described above. As it can be seen, both the squared and the simple 
logarithm of GDP (lagged one year) are significant to explain the variation in within-country 
market income inequality. As expected, the squared term has a negative sign, while the 
simple term has a positive one, thereby suggesting the validity of the Kuznets relationship 
between GDP per capita and income inequality. Moreover, it is obvious that the lags of 
inflation and trade openness both entail sufficient eligibility to be included in the model since 
both comprise significant effects on income inequality. It can be observed that higher 
inflation here actually leads to lower inequality. This result might be a bit counter-intuitive, 
but is also in line with the literature, since e.g. Woo et al. (2013) observe it as well. Referring 
to Bulir (1998), it can be reasoned that this result is inherited in the high-income country 
sample, used here. If lower income countries would be included and examined together with 
the sample in place one could expect a positive relationship between inflation and income 
inequality.  
As it can be seen, higher trade openness is associated with a slight increase in inequality, 
although not significantly. The R2 of this model sums up to 0.275. Hence, a significantly high 
portion of variability can be explained by the controls. It should not be surprising that the 
value is not higher since such a complex concept like income inequality is expected to be 
influenced by an array of other factors than described here.  
Column 2 introduces the dummy for fiscal consolidation to the equation. It can be seen that 
in line with the expectations and keeping all other factors constant, the occurrence of a fiscal 
consolidation on average raises the market inequality about 0.659 Gini points in the year 
after. The effect is found to be statistically significantly different from zero at a 5% confidence 
level. Adding the consolidation occurrence leads to a further R2 increase up 0.296. Since this 
variable only captures the occurrence of a consolidation in the year before, coded with 1 for 
an occurrence or 0 for an absence, the coefficient can only be interpreted as the average 
effect of a consolidation occurrence. It would be more interesting to analyse the 
discretionary effect of a consolidation in points of GDP. Therefore, in column 3 the 
occurrence dummy is replaced by the absolute size of the consolidation episode. This does 
not strongly alter the signs, significance or magnitude of the other coefficients estimated. 
However, the consolidation coefficient now can be interpreted in a more meaningful way: A 
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deliberate improvement of the primary balance about one percent of GDP in one year is 
(ceteris paribus) associated with an increase in market income inequality of 0.597 Gini points 
in the next year, which represent more than half a percent increase in market income 
inequality.6 To put this value in perspective: As described in section 3, the Gini coefficient for 
market income rose on average about 5 points between 1990 and 2010 throughout the OECD 
countries. Loosely speaking, keeping all other factors unchanged, a fiscal consolidation of 1% 
of GDP refers to one tenth of the income inequality rise in two decades in the sample. 
Interestingly, the effect is the second strongest of all controls after the GDP variable. The 
coefficient is found to be statistically significant at a 1% level. This effect is neither negligible 
nor irrelevant for market income inequality. 
 
Table 2: Effects of fiscal consolidation on market income inequality7
 
 
A Panel unit roots test based on Im et al. (2003) shows that the null hypothesis of the Gini 
coefficient being stationary cannot be rejected. Moreover, a Hausman test confirmed that 
fixed effects were appropriate here. Further tests showed some minor deviations from 
                                                          
6 However, one has to acknowledge that this result is with respect to a scenario in which no fiscal 
consolidation is implemented and deficits continue to not cause major disruptions. If this assumption 
would not hold and such a disruption in form of a fiscal crisis would occur because consolidations were 
not undertaken, risks for economic downturns could arise. These risks in turn could lead to even 
greater income inequality caused by absence of fiscal discipline, which cannot be considered in this 
model. 
7 Note: The dependent variable is the market income Gini coefficient. The table reports the referring 
coefficients obtained by a Panel regression system with time and country fixed effects. *, ** & *** in 
this and all following regression outputs indicate significance of the coefficient on a 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
GDP per capita, log, t-1   3.486** {0.015}   3.517** {1.395}   3.453** {1.386}
GDP per capita sqrd, log, t-1 -0.127** {0.060} -0.130** {0.012} -0.127** {0.013}
Inflation, t-1 -0.334*** {0.036} -0.360*** {0.000} -0.360*** {0.000}
Trade Openness, t-1   0.021* {0.069}   0.026** {0.022}   0.028** {0.014}
Consolidation Occurence, t-1   0.659** {0.010}
Consolidation (%), t-1   0.597*** {0.001}
Constant   23.760***{0.005}   23.281***{0.005}   23.577***{0.004}
Countries
N
R sqrd
F 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 P-Values in parantheses
0.275 0.296 0.303
48.613 41.568 43.124
17 17 17
533 517 517
Variable 
(1) (2) (3)
Gini M coeff Gini M coeff Gini M coeff
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normality, especially at the end of the tails, but these are too small to threaten the overall 
validity of the model. All results presented are also corrected for heteroscedasticity.8 
 
Focusing now on net income inequality we replicate the same three models. Column 1 of 
Table 3, therefore, reports the results including only the control variables. As it can be seen, 
the joint effects can only explain 19.7% of the variation in net income inequality while they 
were able to account for 27.5% in market inequality. This already indicates that there must 
be more factors involved in explaining changes in net income inequality. Also, the significance 
of each one of the variables we are considering is relatively lower. Only inflation and to a 
lower extent trade openness are able to explain some of the variation in net income 
inequality at a statistically significant level. The size of the single effects also decreases 
remarkably in comparison to the model with market inequality as the dependent variable, 
thereby indicating that their influences are much stronger on market than on disposable 
income inequality.  
Focusing on the consolidation impact, one can see that the referring coefficient decreases 
both in size and in significance. Based on that, it can already be inferred that redistribution 
poses a very strong impact on net income inequality, not only in normal times but also during 
consolidation episodes. While the coefficient was significant and sizeable (0.597), when 
regressing on market income inequality it is significantly smaller (0.057) and completely loses 
its explanatory power for net income inequality.  
 
Table 3: Effects of fiscal consolidations on net income inequality 9
 
                                                          
8 All test results available from author upon request. 
9 Note: The dependent variable is the net income Gini coefficient.  
GDP per capita, log, t-1   1.529 {0.113}   1.529 {0.108}
GDP per capita sqrd, log, t-1 -0.058 {0.150} -0.059 {0.139}
Inflation, t-1 -0.180*** {0.000} -0.200*** {0.000}
Trade Openness, t-1   0.016* {0.037}   0.018** {0.020}
Consolidation (%), t-1   0.057 {0.627}
Constant 18.841*** {0.001} 18.818*** {0.001}
Countries
N
R sqrd
F 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 P-Values in parantheses
31.454 26.631
17 17
533 517
Variable 
(1) (2)
Gini N coeff Gini N coeff
0.197 0.212
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Supporters of social market economy might interpret this as evidence for functioning social 
states that are able to redistribute from the rich to the poor even in times of fiscal constraints 
and thereby offset negative effects on market income inequality. This presumption is also 
backed by redistribution theory. Paulus et al. (2009), OECD (2011) and Caminada et al. (2012) 
all find that redistributive fiscal policies reduce net inequality. However, it might be a bit too 
early for this conclusion without exploring further the features of the consolidation packages 
implemented. First and foremost, one would have to incorporate clear and unambiguous 
variables capturing redistribution. According to Meltzer & Richard (1981), higher inequality 
creates pressures to redistribute income with the voters having the incentive to push for 
reforms that are going to benefit them. Thereby, as pointed out by the OECD (2015), when 
more inequality leads to more redistribution, one would also have to consider reverse 
causality issues, which further exacerbate a valid econometric analysis. Yet, the results and 
the stated literature point to relevant inequality implications of focusing on taxation and 
government spending within consolidations. Therefore, the next section will deal with the 
differentiation between spending and tax-based consolidations and their effects on both Gini 
coefficients. 
4.2.2 The compositional effects: Tax- vs. spending-based consolidations 
As described earlier, spending cuts are supposed to be more growth-friendly and tend to lead 
to greater debt reduction than tax increases. Now, intuition and earlier studies indicate that 
the opposite might be the case for income inequality. Figure 3 already provides some 
graphical insight on this link. As can be seen on the left part of the graph there is a slightly 
decreasing line of fit between tax cuts size and the resulting change in net income inequality 
in the sample. The opposite is true for spending cuts: As the graph suggests, the net income 
Gini coefficient increases slightly with the size of the spending cuts. Within the sample, 134 
episodes are identified as tax-based consolidations, while spending-based ones occurred 142 
times.10 
 
                                                          
10 See Appendices 4 & 5 for more details. 
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Figure 3: The compositional effect of fiscal consolidations11
 
 
To account for spending and taxation based deficit cuts, the fiscal consolidation dummy that 
we have used so far in our models is first replaced by a tax and a spending consolidation 
dummy variable. These two variables capture the occurrence of either a tax rise or a spending 
cut, respectively. Both are taken from the Devries et al. (2011) database. Table 4 reports the 
findings of this model. Column 1 and 2 refer to market income inequality, whereas column 3 
and 4 are dedicated to the effects on net income inequality. Looking at the results for market 
income inequality, one can observe that both coefficients have the expected sign: While tax 
hikes are associated with lower net income inequality in the year after, the opposite holds 
for spending cuts. More precisely, the occurrence of a tax hike within a consolidation leads 
to an average reduction of market income inequality of 0.409 Gini points, while a spending 
cut leads to a remarkably high rise in market income inequality about 1.192 Gini points in the 
following year. Nevertheless, only the latter is found to be statistically significant. All other 
variables remain significant as well. Replacing the dummies by the actual values as done in 
column 2 indicates the absolute effect of both consolidation instruments. Surprisingly, the 
sign of the tax consolidation coefficient changes now, although not being significant. In 
contrast, the spending cut effect is found to be significant and still relatively large (+ 0.753 
Gini points). Column 2 replaces the dummy variables of spending and tax consolidations by 
their actual values. Doing so confirms the findings from before. However, this augmentation 
does not lead to an improvement of the model explanatory power. In the case of Woo et al. 
(2013) the results look relatively similar. They find spending-based consolidations to result in 
statistically significant inequality increases up to 2%, while tax based ones are slightly 
inequality reducing but not significant.  
Turning to net income inequality, it can be seen in column 4, that spending cuts have a more 
important impact, although the coefficients are not significant. By replacing the occurrence 
                                                          
11 Note: The scatter plots only contain data points, of which the referring values were bigger than zero 
in order to illustrate the discretionary effect of tax rises and spending cuts, respectively.  
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dummies with absolute values the results look rather inconclusive. Once again, it is obvious 
that the model is less powerful in explaining the variation in the independent variable when 
net income inequality is used. At this point, it is important to mention the limitation of the 
data to capture the composition of the tax system and its progressivity. An increase in taxes 
can increase inequality if they are made through indirect taxes rather than e.g. by a 
progressive personal income tax. The data do not capture these alternatives, so it would be 
interesting to control for the tax composition of every country in order to further explore this 
effect. The results for tax-based consolidations can thereby be somewhat ambiguous.  
 
Table 4: Distributional effects of tax- and spending-based consolidations  
(Conventional approach)12
 
 
 
As stated earlier, this conventional approach to differentiate compositional features of 
consolidations is expected to inherit some flaws. Namely, the cited literature just simply uses 
the un-adopted time series of Devries et al. (2011) and incorporates them into their 
regression analysis as done in the last subsection. This procedure is not free of critique. Buyse 
(2015) for example criticizes the IMF (2012) and Agnello & Sousa (2014) for using 
consolidation periods on a year-to-year basis, instead of focusing on the cumulative effects 
of multiple years. More important, problems in this approach arise, since most consolidations 
are mixed ones, meaning consisting of both spending cuts and tax increases. Out of the 165 
consolidation episodes in the sample, 102 were mixed.13 Especially larger consolidations tend 
to be achieved by a composition of both measures. This is not surprising since it might be 
                                                          
12 Note: The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient for market income Gini coefficient (columns 1 
& 2) and net income inequality (columns 3 & 4), respectively. 
13 See Appendix 8 for more details. 
GDP per capita, log, t-1   3.595** {0.010}   3.498* {0.012}   1.56 {0.101}   1.493 {0.117}
GDP per capita sqrd, log, t-1 -0.133* {0.023} -0.128* {0.028} -0.060 {0.131} -0.058 {0.147}
Inflation, t-1 -0.353*** {0.000} -0.356*** {0.000} -0.198*** {0.000} -0.203*** {0.000}
Trade Openness, t-1   0.026** {0.021}   0.028** {0.015}   0.018** {0.019}   0.018** {0.019}
Tax Consolidation Occurence, t-1 -0.409 {0.270} -0.195 {0.442}
Spending Cons. Occurence, t-1   1.192*** {0.001}   0.290 {0.237}
Tax Consolidation (%), t-1   0.368 {0.273}   0.241 {0.293}
Spending Cons. (%), t-1   0.753** {0.004} -0.068 {0.702}
Constant 22.817** {0.005} 23.253** {0.004} 18.616*** {0.001} 19.078*** {0.001}
Countries
N
R sqrd
F 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 P-Values in parantheses
(4)
Gini N coeff
17
517
0.213
22.332
0.305 0.304 0.214
36.170 36.016 22.394
17 17 17
517 517 517
Variable 
(1) (2) (3)
Gini M coeff Gini M coeff Gini N coeff
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hard to justify, why a consolidation should only be done on one side of the budget balance. 
The traditional approach hereby just identifies any episode as a spending one, whenever a 
cut in spending occurs, not accounting for tax increases implemented in the same year and 
vice versa. After disentangling the episodes in spending-only, tax-only and mixed ones, the 
distribution of the episodes looks a bit different than presented in the last subsection: Only 
25 of all consolidation years were tax-only ones, 38 spending-only and the rest mixed, as 
stated above.14  
Figure 4 graphically explains the big differences of the average results between the 
conventional and the augmented approach regarding the average length, cumulated 
consolidation size, and the associated increases in both Gini coefficients in the same year and 
the year after. As shown here, both the length and the cumulated size of consolidations are 
much smaller for both tax-only and spending-only consolidations. While tax-only 
consolidations are slightly longer, spending-only ones are much larger in size. However, it is 
striking that both are much shorter and less sizeable than mixed one, as assumed. The largest 
benefit of this approach lies in the more accurate way to look at distributional impacts of 
different consolidation compositions. While spending-only ones are followed by mild 
increases in both inequality measures, tax-only ones are actually followed by a decrease in 
income inequality. Mixed consolidations, on the other hand, are longer, larger, and less 
equitable than single side measures.  
 
                                                          
14 A detailed breakdown of the episodes into tax-based only, spending-based only and mixed 
consolidations can be found in Appendices 6 - 8. 
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Figure 4: Compositional consolidation effects depending on definition15
 
 
Yet, these findings should be treated with extreme caution. As it has been said, single side 
consolidations tend to be much smaller than combined measures. Combining this thought 
with the earlier finding of the linear relationship between consolidation size and income 
inequality leads the way to the conclusion that causality rather runs from consolidation size 
to composition measure. However, it can clearly be seen that there is a difference in the 
inequality effects of spending-only and tax-only consolidations. Having said that and keeping 
the caveats of graphical approaches in mind, it makes sense to incorporate the new indicators 
in the econometric model from earlier. Table 5 presents the findings of the same model like 
in the last section but uses the augmented approach to identify compositional effects. Again, 
the first two columns report the coefficients’ effects on market income inequality. As can be 
seen, the occurrence of a tax-only consolidation decreases market income inequality on 
average by 0.602 Gini points the following year, ceteris paribus, although the effect is not 
significant.16 The occurrence of a spending-only consolidation is found to be significant on a 
95% confidence level and leads to an increase of market inequality by 1.061 Gini points in 
                                                          
15 Source: Author’s own calculations based on Devries et al. (2011) & Solt (2009). Note: The vertical 
axis denotes the average cumulative values for the consolidation length (in years), the consolidation 
size (in percent of GDP), and the resulting changes in inequality (in Gini points), respectively. 
16 The low significance level might to some extent also be explained by the relative low amount of 
observations that are considered spending-only and even more relevant for those, which are tax-only. 
This fact already points to further research potential regarding theses consolidation types in a bigger 
sample. 
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the year after. Mixed consolidations score up to 0.813 Gini points and are significant at 1%. 
Replacing the dummies by absolute values confirm these findings with the same signs and 
significance levels. These results are also in the spirit of the theoretical concepts of Ball et al. 
(2001), who argue that spending-based consolidations reduce the wage share in total 
income. While wage loss effects are persistent over time, losses on capital and rent incomes 
are rather short-lived, hence the widening of market income inequality.  
Turning to net income inequality (columns 3 & 4), the new approach produces findings 
congruent to the model applied before. Inconclusive results appear when comparing the 
model with occurrence dummies with the model including absolute values. Hence, again the 
applied variables seem not to be relevant enough to explain the full effect on net income 
inequality. However, it can clearly be seen that the augmented approach delivers meaningful 
results for market income inequality that are more accurate in describing the discretionary 
effect of one-sided and mixed consolidations, than what is defined in the literature. Hence, 
the hypothesis that spending-based consolidations are less equitable could be proved using 
both the conventional and the augmented approach.  
 
Table 5: Distributional effects of tax-only, spending-only and mixed consolidations  
 (Augmented approach)17 
 
 
The results shown here indicate a strong justification for the use of the augmented approach 
to identify compositions of fiscal consolidations. While the conventional approach delivers 
flawed results in differentiating between the true effects of spending cuts and tax rises, 
                                                          
17 Note: The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient for market income Gini coefficient (columns 1 
& 2) and net income inequality (columns 3 & 4), respectively. 
GDP per capita, log, t-1   3.598*** {0.010}   3.608*** {0.010}   1.567* {0.099}   1.537 {0.107}
GDP per capita sqrd, log, t-1 -0.134** {0.022} -0.133** {0.023} -0.062 {0.123} -0.060 {0.135}
Inflation, t-1 -0.353*** {0.000} -0.357*** {0.000} -0.197*** {0.000} -0.201*** {0.000}
Trade Openness, t-1   0.026** {0.022}   0.027** {0.016}   0.017** {0.024}   0.018** {0.018}
Tax-only Cons. Occurence, t-1 -0.602 {0.272} -0.739* {0.048}
Spending-Only Cons. Occurence, t-1   1.061** {0.019} -0.082 {0.790}
Mixed Cons. Occurence, t-1   0.813*** {0.007}   0.179 {0.386}
Tax-Only Consolidation (%), t-1 -0.008 {0.992}   0.078 {0.886}
Spending-Only Cons. (%), t-1   0.798** {0.013} -0.132 {0.546}
Mixed Cons. (%), t-1   0.524*** {0.003}   0.148 {0.225}
Constant 22.861** {0.005} 22.640** {0.006} 18.741*** {0.001} 18.795*** {0.001}
Countries
N
R sqrd
F 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 P-Values in parantheses
0.306 0.305 0.220 0.215
30.987 30.965 19.867 19.267
17 17 17 17
517 517 517 517
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini M coeff Gini M coeff Gini N coeff Gini N coeff
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respectively, the augmented approach seems to be more accurate. Hence, a more 
pronounced view on the composition of consolidations is possible: By comparing the results 
of both approaches, one can see that the most relevant distributional effects of 
consolidations stem from spending-side measures and mixed consolidations. Especially the 
latter is highly interesting and adds a strong contribution to the literature since the traditional 
approach does not account for mixed consolidations, although they form the large majority 
of all consolidations in the sample. Both approaches find that tax-based consolidations are 
actually income inequality-reducing, although not statistically significantly. Interestingly, the 
coefficients for spending-based consolidations in both approaches are similar in size and 
significance. At first sight, these results suggest using tax hikes as preferred instrument for 
fiscal consolidations, since they tend to be followed by improving distributional outcomes. 
However, it seems that this fact can rather be ascribed to the generally smaller consolidation 
sizes that these consolidation packages are usually comprised of. Furthermore, as pointed 
out in the literature review, these consolidations are found to be less suitable to meet debt 
reduction and growth targets. Thus, the augmented approach points to the importance of 
also considering the accompanying conditions of all three types of consolidations: E.g. while 
tax-based ones tend to be followed by a reduction in income inequality, they should not be 
interpreted as equity-friendly per se. It rather seems that this effect rather stems from the 
small size that tax-only consolidations entail. This thought is also backed by the somewhat 
larger and significant effect of mixed consolidations, which are also found to be the largest 
in cumulative consolidation size. Hence, further research potential focusing on the interplay 
between accompanying consolidation conditions, such as pressure to consolidate, their 
composition and the public opinion on these plans is found already here.  
 
Reviewing our results so far, some important comments have to be made. Different policies 
tend to have varying effects across countries and also at different points in time, possibly 
depending on further accompanying features, not accounted for here.18 Moreover, 
measurement issues may bias our results. As it is shown, an array of inter-related factors, 
that sometimes take a long time to unfold, drive inequality outcomes over time. Bearing 
these limitations in mind, the present analysis still provides a nuanced examination of the 
effect of different approaches to consolidation on inequality. To judge if the reported effects 
                                                          
18 Other features such as the size and length of the consolidation, occurrence during and after financial 
crises, and accompanying macroeconomic conditions were also examined econometrically form 
during the preparation of this article, but will not be interpreted here, since this would go beyond the 
scope and space limits of this article.  
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hold under different specifications, a sensitivity analysis will be undertaken in the next 
section. 
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
So far, each of the applied models used one-year time lags in the independent variables, in 
order to account for the slightly delayed effects, any policy changes pose on income 
inequality. However, as seen in the graphical presentations in the last chapter, there seem 
to be some reactions already in the year of consolidation occurrence. Therefore, this section 
will test the sensitivity of the baseline model including both inequality measures as 
dependent variables, as well as the augmented approach for compositional differences for 
distributional changes in the year of occurrence. 
Table 6 provides the re-estimated baseline model without lags in the variables. Column 1 
depicts the augmented results for market income inequality and column 2 for net income 
inequality. Since all observations now can be used, the sample size increases to 533. 
Interestingly, the coefficients for market income inequality keep their signs and significance 
levels with the exception of trade openness, which now is significant at 1%. The coefficients 
for the control variables remain consistent with our earlier estimations. Turning to the 
consolidation effect, the referring coefficient is 0.488, which indicates that the distributional 
effect of a consolidation is somewhat smaller in the year of its occurrence than in the year 
after. This is not surprising, as the graphical presentation in the last chapter has already 
indicated. The R2 is only slightly lower in this model. Hence, it can be derived that the model 
is robust in replacing lagged effects by same year consequences. Looking at the results for 
net income inequality, the control variables appear largely congruent to the baseline model. 
However, the consolidation effect here turns negative, in contradiction with the original 
model. Therefore, this again proves the weaknesses of the model for net income inequality. 
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Table 6: Effects of fiscal consolidation on income inequality in the year of occurrence19
 
 
Perhaps more important than testing the sensitivity of the baseline model is to see if the 
augmented approach on the compositional effect holds true since this approach was not 
tested before. Table 7 presents this model’s findings, using non-lagged regressor sets. As can 
be seen in the first two columns, all controls remain significant, with trade openness again 
increasing its significance. The coefficients are slightly lower in size than in the usual model, 
although not remarkably. Moreover, the significance levels almost stay the same; only mixed 
consolidations are now found to be significant at 5%, instead of 1% previously. The R2 drops 
only slightly in both cases. Turning to the results for net income inequality, we confirm the 
rather mixed findings from the last subsection since all consolidation types are found to lower 
inequality, whereas none of them is statistically significant. 
 
                                                          
19 Note: The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient for market income Gini coefficient (column 1) 
and net income inequality (columns 2), respectively. 
GDP per capita, log   3.611** {0.011}   1.949* {0.042}
GDP per capita sqrd, log -0.134** {0.025} -0.074* {0.066}
Inflation -0.348*** {0.000} -0.185*** {0.000}
Trade Openness   0.033*** {0.004}   0.019** {0.012}
Consolidation (%)   0.488*** {0.004} -0.078 {0.492}
Constant 22.182*** {0.008}   23.281** {0.005}
Countries
N
R sqrd
F 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 P-Values in parantheses
533
0.291 0.202
41.942 25.912
Variable 
(1) (2)
Gini M coeff Gini N coeff
1717
533
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Table 7: Distributional effects of tax-only, spending-only and mixed consolidations in the 
year of occurrence (augmented approach)20
 
 
Overall, these results thereby again confirm the stated idea that i) spending-only 
consolidations are less equitable and ii) the effects of any consolidation are more 
pronounced one year after the package is implemented. Thus, it seems that the augmented 
approach to identify the composition of fiscal consolidations can be considered as robust in 
this case.  
                                                          
20 Note: The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient for market income Gini coefficient (columns 1 
& 2) and net income inequality (columns 3 & 4), respectively. 
 
GDP per capita, log   3.758*** {0.008}   3.694*** {0.009}   1.955** {0.042}   1.961** {0.042}
GDP per capita sqrd, log -0.14** {0.020} -0.136** {0.023} -0.075* {0.063} -0.075* {0.064}
Inflation -0.342*** {0.000} -0.344*** {0.000} -0.184*** {0.000} -0.186*** {0.000}
Trade Openness   0.032*** {0.005}   0.033*** {0.004}   0.019** {0.014}   0.019** {0.015}
Tax-only Cons. Occurence -0.382   0.948** -0.695* -0.157
Spending-Only Cons. Occurence   0.948** {0.041} -0.157 {0.615}
Mixed Cons. Occurence   0.662** {0.032} -0.022 {0.914}
Tax-Only Consolidation (%) -0.162 {0.840} -0.415 {0.445}
Spending-Only Cons. (%)   0.798** {0.026} -0.265 {0.273}
Mixed Cons. (%)   0.439** {0.016} -0.027 {0.828}
Constant 21.316** {0.011} 21.572*** {0.010} 16.050*** {0.004} 15.952*** {0.005}
Countries
N
R sqrd
F 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 P-Values in parantheses
0.292 0.293 0.207 0.204
29.932 30.167 18.981 18.657
17 17 17 17
533 533 533 533
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini M coeff Gini M coeff Gini N coeff Gini N coeff
 5 Conclusion 
This paper examined the effects of several fiscal consolidation indicators and a set of 
compositional variables on income inequality by using econometric analysis for a panel of 
high-income countries over the last four decades. The results suggest that fiscal 
consolidations are relevant levers for income inequality. It was found that on average, a 
consolidation of one percent of GDP is associated with an increase in market income 
inequality of 0.6% in the next year. Net income inequality is found to be less affected by 
austerity measures, which indicates the strong redistributive power of the social welfare 
state. Moreover, the hypothesis that spending cuts spark income inequality more than tax 
rises could be supported by the data. Even more relevant, in adopting the conventional 
approach to identifying compositional features of consolidations to episodes that are 
exclusively undertaken on the spending or the tax revenue side, this paper acts as an 
innovation for the very narrow literature in this field. Applying this novel approach leads to 
even more pronounced findings regarding the compositional effect. It was proven that 
consolidations, which were undertaken only through tax hikes, produce more equitable 
outcomes, although they tend to be rather small in consolidation size. Another important 
finding consists in the fact that especially mixed consolidations are found to be significantly 
harming the income distribution. Since these consolidations tend to be most sizeable, these 
two findings combined, point in the direction of considering accompanying consolidation 
features such as policymakers’ pressure to consolidate and the public opinion on these plans 
as decisive elements for the distribution outcomes, rather than just looking at the pure 
composition.  
This paper thereby clearly demonstrates that the conventional method for studying 
compositional effects of fiscal consolidations entails some serious flaws since it fails to 
identify consolidation episodes, only based on spending cuts or tax rises. In this vein, it is 
important to note that all studies on the success and growth effect of fiscal consolidations so 
far rely on the conventional approach on how to identify spending and tax-based episodes. 
Therefore, it might be promising to implement the augmented approach also for this kind of 
studies in order to produce meaningful results for the discretionary effect of tax-only and 
spending-only consolidation. Since this paper was not able to obtain conclusive results for 
compositional effects on net income inequality, there is potential for further research on the 
proper analysis of the referring levers.  
Further tests to these results should be undertaken using different inequality indicators since 
the Gini coefficient is not sensitive to changes at the tails of income distributions and a large 
5 Conclusion  29 
share of the surge in income inequality is expected to stem from diverging top and bottom 
income groups.  
Although one should be careful about deriving concrete policy recommendations from these 
results, one conclusion clearly stands out: Fiscal consolidations generally go hand in hand 
with increased inequality. Even though consolidations exclusively undertaken on the tax side 
lead to favourable income equality outcomes, they seem to act less successful on debt 
reduction and are considered less growth-friendly. Looking ahead, further large 
consolidations are expected to be required for many developed countries, given their current 
fiscal positions. Keeping the historically unprecedented high levels of inequality and their 
possible social and economic fallouts in mind, these countries should do everything in their 
power to prevent another rise in income inequality. Therefore, it will be critical to design 
upcoming consolidation packages in a way that they are able to fairly distribute their burden 
throughout the society and not disproportionally on the back of the most vulnerable citizens. 
Yet, given the sizeable consolidation needs, it is more than questionable if a single focus on 
tax revenue rises might be the right strategy to achieve both, positive outcomes for debt 
reduction and growth on the one hand and a containment of inequality on the other. Hence, 
there is a large need for further academic research to elaborate on specific consolidation 
instruments that fulfil all these targets. Moreover, it might be the right time to conclude that 
it seems that the dangerous economic cocktail of high-income inequality and large 
consolidation needs might entail a greater risk for the stability of market economies than is 
usually believed among academic scholars. Perhaps, if in this environment the conventional 
consolidation methods are not sufficient enough to meet the described targets; one should 
seriously reconsider the robustness of the current macroeconomic structure of many 
developed countries. In this vein, this paper ends with the words of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s 
chair Janet Yellen (2014): “Inequality has risen to the point that it seems to me worthwhile 
[…] to seriously consider taking the risk of making our economy more rewarding for more of 
the people“. 
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 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Variable description
Variable Description
I. Dependent
Gini M Market income inequality Gini coeff. SWIID, v. 4.1
Gini N Net income inequality Gini coeff. SWIID, v. 4.1
II. Fiscal consolidation
Consolidation Occurence 1 - Occurence, 0 - no occurence
Consolidation (%) improvement of primary balance in % of GDP
Spending based consolidation occurence 1 - Occurence, 0 - no occurence
Spending based consolidation (%) improvement of primary balance in % of GDP
Tax based consolidation occurence 1 - Occurence, 0 - no occurence
Tax based consolidation (%) improvement of primary balance in % of GDP
Spending-only occurence 1 - Occurence, 0 - no occurence
Spending-only (%) improvement of primary balance in % of GDP
Tax-only occurence 1 - Occurence, 0 - no occurence
Tax-only (%) improvement of primary balance in % of GDP
Mixed consolidation occurence 1 - Occurence, 0 - no occurence
Mixed consolidation (%) improvement of primary balance in % of GDP
III. Controls
GDP per capita Real GDP (PPP converted) in const. 2005 USD Penn World Tables (v. 7.1)
GDP per capita sqrd Real GDP (PPP converted) in const. 2005 USD Penn World Tables (v. 7.1)
Inflation Annual change in CPI
Trade Openness Sum of Imports & Exports divided by GDP World Bank's WDI database
Europe 1 - European country, 0 - not
Before 1994 1 - before 1994, 0 - not
all from Devries et al. (2011)
Source
OECD Economic Outlook 
database (No. 98)
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics
 
 
Appendix 3: Consolidations per country 
 
 
country       538     17  9.055762       1       17  Country
before1994    538      2  .4962825       0        1  before 1994
ginigch       530    476  .1934642  -3.431    4.932  GiniGCh
gininch       530    457  .0796038  -1.477      2.6  GiniNCh
europe        538      2  .7732342       0        1  EUROPE
loggdppcslag  538    532  103.4904  52.218  305.438  log(GDP p C), s, lag
loggdppclag   538    417  10.15913   7.226   17.477  log(GDP p C), lag
tradeoplag    538    537  63.09067  15.924  175.174  Trade Op, lag
spenconsoc~g  521      2  .2667946       0        1  Spen Cons (Occ), lag
taxconsocc~g  521      2  .2418426       0        1  Tax Cons (Occ),lag
consocclag    521      2  .3147793       0        1  Cons (Occ), lag
spenconslag   521    110  .1999175    -.29     3.71  Spen Cons (%), lag
taxconslag    521    120  .1188138    -.75     2.54  Tax Cons (%), lag
conslag       521    130  .3187351    -.75     4.49  Cons (%), lag
inflationlag  538    517  4.693983     -.9   31.017  Inflation, lag
inflation     538    517  4.328725  -1.347   28.385  Inflation
tradeop       538    537  63.76428  15.924  175.174  Trade Op
loggdppcs     538    533  103.9263  52.218  305.438  log(GDP p C), s
loggdppc      538    416  10.18027   7.226   17.477  log(GDP p C)
spenconsocc   538      2   .260223       0        1  Spen Cons (Occ)
taxconsocc    538      2  .2360595       0        1  Tax Cons (Occ)
consocc       538      2  .3066914       0        1  Cons (Occ)
mixedlag      521      5  .2476008       0        4  Mixed (%), lag
spenonlylag   521      5   .074856       0        4  Spen only (%), lag
taxonlylag    521      3  .0172745       0        2  Tax only (%), lag
mixed         538     80  .2412268       0     4.74  Mixed (%)
spenonly      538     37  .0708922       0     3.71  Spen only (%)
taxonly       538     21  .0229368       0      1.9  Tax only (%)
mixedocclag   521      2   .193858       0        1  Mixed (Occ), lag
spenonlyoc~g  521      2  .0729367       0        1  Spen only (Occ), lag
taxonlyocc~g  521      2  .0479846       0        1  Tax only (Occ), lag
mixedocc      538      2  .1895911       0        1  mixed (Occ)
spenonlyocc   538      2   .070632       0        1  Spen only (Occ)
taxonlyocc    538      2  .0464684       0        1  Tax only (Occ)
spencons      538    111  .1980502    -.29     3.71  Spen Cons (%)
taxcons       538    121  .1194257    -.75     2.54  Tax Cons
cons          538    131  .3174796    -.75    4.743  Cons (%)
ginig         533    160  45.77824    33.1     56.6  GiniG
ginin         533    164  28.49081    19.7     37.8  GiniN
year          538     33  1993.586    1977     2009  Year
                                                                                                                                             
Variable      Obs Unique      Mean     Min      Max  Label
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Appendix 4: Overview of Tax-based consolidations (conventional approach)
 
 
Appendix 5: Overview of Spending-based consolidations (conventional approach)
 
 
Period Δ Cons Δ GiniM
Δ GiniM, 
t+1
Δ GiniN
Δ GiniN, 
t+1
Period Δ Cons Δ GiniM
Δ GiniM, 
t+1
Δ GiniN
Δ GiniN, 
t+1
Australia 1986-1987 0.36 -0.56 0.16 0.03 0.50 Japan 1979-1983 1.13 -6.33 -4.21 -1.10 0.07
1994-1998 1.32 3.38 2.50 1.38 1.17 1997-1998 1.30 1.18 2.01 1.14 1.32
Austria 1980-1981 0.61 . . . . 2004-2007 0.85 -0.85 -0.34 0.21 0.21
1984 1.30 -0.94 -2.16 -0.38 -0.88 Netherlands 1981 0.53 0.98 0.46 0.27 0.18
1996-1997 1.32 -0.91 -0.44 -1.10 -0.80 1983 0.49 0.79 -0.69 0.34 -0.70
2001 0.90 0.81 0.72 0.45 0.33 1987 1.48 0.21 -0.92 -0.23 0.97
Belgium 1983-1985 1.70 2.43 1.88 -0.11 0.09 1991-1993 0.13 1.00 0.18 -0.90 -0.83
1990 0.40 1.08 0.37 0.02 -0.44 2004-2005 0.60 0.51 0.24 0.71 0.41
1992-1994 1.97 1.12 1.60 1.61 4.40 Portugal 1983 1.35 -2.46 0.47 -1.31 -1.04
1996-1997 0.91 1.00 0.36 -1.60 0.35 2002 1.20 1.22 2.74 0.32 0.45
Canada 1984-1997 3.34 5.01 6.74 0.49 2.53 2005-2007 2.12 2.13 -0.05 -1.16 -1.68
Denmark 1983-1985 2.36 -1.79 -1.11 -0.88 -0.55 Spain 1983-1984 2.27 -1.81 -2.24 -1.67 -1.93
1995 0.30 -0.18 0.07 -0.76 0.23 1989 0.98 2.31 2.84 1.43 1.95
Finland 1994 0.69 1.32 1.37 0.29 0.34 1992-1993 1.10 3.76 2.79 2.51 1.91
France 1979 0.85 0.10 0.22 -0.18 -0.12 1996-1997 0.30 -1.32 -1.15 -0.33 -0.52
1995-1997 1.70 0.64 0.03 -0.28 -0.27 Sweden 1984 0.21 0.20 0.36 0.25 0.25
Germany 1982-1983 0.86 0.80 2.77 1.60 1.17 1993-1998 3.81 0.67 -0.04 -0.33 1.18
1991-1995 2.20 1.66 0.36 0.76 0.38 United Kingdom 1981-1982 1.90 1.71 1.89 0.31 0.56
1997 0.50 0.21 0.16 -0.13 -0.13 1994-1995 0.90 1.46 -0.03 0.45 0.41
1999 0.30 0.28 0.83 0.01 -0.01 1994-1999 1.04 -0.37 -0.51 0.29 -0.10
2003 0.74 0.43 0.39 0.20 0.19 United States 1978 0.14 0.05 0.04 -0.34 -0.48
2007 0.50 0.41 0.03 0.45 0.45 1980-1981 0.29 0.41 0.52 0.75 0.66
Ireland 1981-1986 6.66 -0.96 0.06 -0.64 -0.14 1985-1986 0.31 1.50 0.89 1.26 0.71
2008 2.35 1.74 2.01 -0.20 -0.12 1988 0.39 0.20 0.21 0.12 0.10
Italy 1991-1998 7.59 5.72 6.54 4.59 4.88 1990-1997 1.61 3.62 3.16 3.86 3.61
2004-2007 2.89 -0.74 -2.20 -0.90 -1.60
Average 2.63 1.39 0.64 0.63 0.23 0.38
∑  episodes/years 51/134
Period Δ Cons Δ GiniM
Δ GiniM, 
t+1
Δ GiniN
Δ GiniN, 
t+1
Period Δ Cons Δ GiniM
Δ GiniM, 
t+1
Δ GiniN
Δ GiniN, 
t+1
Australia 1985-1988 2.38 1.01 0.00 0.82 1.00 Italy 1991-1998 11.64 5.72 6.54 4.59 4.88
1996-1999 1.19 0.33 1.57 0.11 1.01 2004-2007 1.83 -0.74 -2.20 -0.90 -1.60
Austria 1980-1981 1.75 . . . . Japan 1982-1983 0.76 -1.05 0.28 0.49 1.05
1984 0.74 -0.94 -2.16 -0.38 -0.88 1997-1998 0.60 1.18 2.01 1.14 1.32
1996-1997 2.65 -0.91 -0.44 -1.10 -0.80 2003-2006 1.42 -1.74 -0.85 0.05 0.21
2001-2002 0.67 1.53 1.40 0.78 0.57 Netherlands 1981-1986 10.42 1.12 0.14 -0.59 -1.08
Belgium 1982-1985 4.05 2.91 2.65 -0.01 0.10 1988 0.75 -0.92 -0.71 0.97 0.93
1987 2.80 0.32 0.16 0.17 0.12 1992-1993 1.60 0.76 -0.11 -0.48 -0.59
1990 0.20 1.08 0.37 0.02 -0.44 2004-2005 1.60 0.51 0.24 0.71 0.41
1992-1994 1.89 1.12 1.60 1.61 4.40 Portugal 1983 0.95 -2.46 0.47 -1.31 -1.04
1996-1997 1.00 1.00 0.36 -1.60 0.35 2000 0.50 -1.12 0.62 -0.10 0.23
Canada 1985-1997 4.59 4.54 6.51 0.53 2.60 2002 0.40 1.22 2.74 0.32 0.45
Denmark 1983-1985 4.33 -1.79 -1.11 -0.88 -0.55 2005-2007 1.53 2.13 -0.05 -1.16 -1.68
Finland 1992-1997 12.07 6.51 4.11 2.02 2.74 Spain 1984 0.75 -0.79 -1.45 -0.75 -1.18
France 1987 0.76 -0.31 0.15 -1.28 -0.80 1989 0.24 2.31 2.84 1.43 1.95
1991 0.25 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.04 1992-1997 5.24 5.26 2.30 3.73 1.93
1996-1997 0.56 0.28 -0.22 -0.17 -0.21 Sweden 1984 0.69 0.20 0.36 0.25 0.25
Germany 1982-1984 1.78 3.40 2.59 2.10 0.98 1993-1998 6.78 0.67 -0.04 -0.33 1.18
1991-1995 1.47 1.66 0.36 0.76 0.38 United Kingdom 1979-1982 1.14 4.04 3.41 0.81 0.71
1997 1.10 0.21 0.16 -0.13 -0.13 1994-1999 0.68 0.56 -0.90 0.65 0.32
2000 0.75 0.26 0.83 -0.01 0.43 United States 1988 0.46 0.20 0.21 0.12 0.10
2004 1.10 0.39 0.26 0.19 0.22 1990-1998 2.31 3.45 2.98 3.73 3.47
2006-2007 0.90 0.74 0.44 0.78 0.34
Ireland 1981-1982 0.32 -0.65 -1.02 -0.29 -0.54
1986-1987 3.07 1.25 0.20 0.65 0.19 Average 2.96 2.23 0.96 0.83 0.37 0.48
2008 2.39 1.74 2.01 -0.20 -0.12 ∑  episodes/years 48/142
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Appendix 7: Overview of Spending-only consolidations (augmented approach)
 
 
Period Δ Cons Δ GiniM
Δ GiniM, 
t+1
Δ GiniN
Δ GiniN, 
t+1
Australia 1994-1995 0.75 3.69 1.47 1.72 0.56
Canada 1984 0.27 0.47 0.23 -0.04 -0.07
1988 0.33 0.13 0.22 -0.31 -0.18
Denmark 1995 0.30 -0.18 0.07 -0.76 0.23
France 1979 0.85 0.10 0.22 -0.18 -0.12
1995 0.43 0.37 0.25 -0.11 -0.06
Germany 1999 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.01 -0.01
2003 0.74 0.43 0.39 0.20 0.19
Ireland 1983-1985 1.15 -0.75 0.27 -0.54 -0.06
Italy 2007 1.32 -0.61 -0.86 -0.47 -0.61
Japan 1979-1981 0.76 -5.28 -4.49 -1.60 -0.98
2007 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.06 0.05
Netherlands 1987 1.48 0.21 -0.92 -0.23 0.97
1991 0.87 0.24 0.29 -0.42 -0.24
Spain 1983 1.90 -1.02 -0.79 -0.92 -0.75
United States 1978 0.14 0.05 0.04 -0.34 -0.48
1980-1981 0.29 0.41 0.52 0.75 0.66
1985-1986 0.31 1.50 0.89 1.26 0.71
Average 1.39 0.69 0.01 -0.10 -0.11 -0.01
∑  episodes/years 18/25
Period Δ Cons Δ GiniM
Δ GiniM, 
t+1
Δ GiniN
Δ GiniN, 
t+1
Australia 1985 0.45 1.33 -0.49 0.38 -0.06
1988 0.37 0.23 0.33 0.41 0.56
1999 0.07 0.65 0.53 0.44 0.40
Austria 2002 0.55 0.72 0.68 0.33 0.24
Belgium 1982 1.66 0.48 0.77 0.11 0.01
1987 2.80 0.32 0.16 0.17 0.12
Canada 1992-1993 0.58 1.47 1.59 0.18 0.24
Finland 1992-1993 4.62 4.11 3.19 0.07 0.35
1995-1997 4.68 1.08 -0.45 1.66 2.04
France 1987 0.76 -0.31 0.15 -1.28 -0.80
1991 0.25 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.04
Germany 1984 0.59 2.60 -0.18 0.50 -0.20
1993 0.18 -0.58 -0.07 0.14 0.13
2000 0.75 0.26 0.83 -0.01 0.43
2004 1.10 0.39 0.26 0.19 0.22
2006 0.50 0.33 0.41 0.33 0.45
Ireland 1987 1.95 0.81 -0.61 0.46 -0.26
Italy 1994 1.70 -0.16 0.26 -0.13 0.13
1996 1.08 0.22 0.34 0.09 0.25
Japan 2003 0.48 -0.78 -0.35 -0.11 0.06
Netherlands 1982 1.71 0.46 0.79 0.18 0.34
1984-1986 4.74 -1.11 -0.21 -1.37 -0.90
1988 0.75 -0.92 -0.71 0.97 0.93
1992-1993 1.60 0.76 -0.11 -0.48 -0.59
Portugal 2000 0.50 -1.12 0.62 -0.10 0.23
Spain 1994-1995 2.34 2.82 0.65 1.55 0.54
United Kingdom 1979-1980 0.93 2.34 1.52 0.50 0.15
1996 0.30 -0.53 -0.35 -0.09 0.01
United States 1998 0.15 -0.18 -0.18 -0.13 -0.14
Average 1.31 1.32 0.54 0.32 0.17 0.17
∑  episodes/years 29/38
Appendices  38 
Appendix 8: Overview of mixed consolidations (augmented approach)
 
Period Δ Cons Δ GiniM
Δ GiniM, 
t+1
Δ GiniN
Δ GiniN, 
t+1
Period Δ Cons Δ GiniM
Δ GiniM, 
t+1
Δ GiniN
Δ GiniN, 
t+1
Australia 1986-1987 1.92 -0.56 0.16 0.03 0.50 Italy 1996-1997 2.50 0.78 0.28 0.71 -0.26
1996-1998 1.69 -0.32 1.04 -0.33 0.61 2004-2006 3.69 -0.13 -1.34 -0.43 -0.99
Austria 1980-1981 2.36 . . . . Japan 1982-1983 1.13 -1.05 0.28 0.49 1.05
1984 2.04 -0.94 -2.16 -0.38 -0.88 1997-1998 1.90 1.18 2.01 1.14 1.32
1996-1997 3.97 -0.91 -0.44 -1.10 -0.80 2004-2006 1.64 -0.96 -0.51 0.15 0.15
2001 1.02 0.81 0.72 0.45 0.33 Netherlands 1981 1.75 0.98 0.46 0.27 0.18
Belgium 1983-1985 4.09 2.43 1.88 -0.11 0.09 1983 3.24 0.79 -0.69 0.34 -0.70
1990 0.60 1.08 0.37 0.02 -0.44 2004-2005 2.20 0.51 0.24 0.71 0.41
1992-1994 3.86 1.12 1.60 1.61 4.40 Portugal 1983 2.30 -2.46 0.47 -1.31 -1.04
1996-1997 1.91 1.00 0.36 -1.60 0.35 2002 1.60 1.22 2.74 0.32 0.45
Canada 1985-1986 2.30 0.24 0.14 -0.27 -0.50 2005-2007 3.65 2.13 -0.05 -1.16 -1.68
1989-1991 1.58 1.67 2.16 0.11 0.34 Spain 1984 1.12 -0.79 -1.45 -0.75 -1.18
1994-1997 2.92 1.03 2.40 0.82 2.70 1989 1.22 2.31 2.84 1.43 1.95
Denmark 1983-1985 6.69 -1.79 -1.11 -0.88 -0.55 1992-1993 1.80 3.76 2.79 2.51 1.91
Finland 1994 3.46 1.32 1.37 0.29 0.34 1996-1997 2.50 -1.32 -1.15 -0.33 -0.52
France 1996-1997 1.83 0.28 -0.22 -0.17 -0.21 Sweden 1984 0.90 0.20 0.36 0.25 0.25
Germany 1982-1983 2.05 0.80 2.77 1.60 1.17 1993-1988 10.59 0.67 -0.04 -0.33 1.18
1991-1992 1.57 1.98 -0.15 0.56 0.40 United Kingdom 1981-1982 2.11 1.71 1.89 0.31 0.56
1994-1995 1.99 0.26 0.58 0.06 -0.15 1994-1995 1.10 1.46 -0.03 0.45 0.41
1997 1.60 0.21 0.16 -0.13 -0.13 1997-1999 1.21 -0.37 -0.51 0.29 -0.10
2007 0.90 0.41 0.03 0.45 -0.11 United States 1988 0.85 0.20 0.21 0.12 0.10
Ireland 1981 5.30 -0.65 -1.02 -0.29 -0.54 1990-1997 3.77 3.62 3.16 3.86 3.61
1986 1.65 0.44 0.81 0.19 0.46
2008 4.74 1.74 2.01 -0.20 -0.12
Italy 1991-1993 10.76 4.62 5.44 3.79 4.67 Average 2.13 2.70 0.65 0.65 0.29 0.40
1995 4.20 0.26 0.22 0.13 0.09 ∑  episodes/years 48/102
